“PRISONERS OF THE MIND”?: THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF
COMPARING THE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED MENTALLY
ILL TO PRETRIAL DETAINEES IN FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSES
Carol Trevey
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INTRODUCTION
1

In addition to substandard conditions of confinement, the involuntarily committed experience a stunning lack of privacy while insti2
tutionalized. One commentator relates a former patient’s description of life in an institution as follows:
Everything is taken from you, you share a door-less room with as
other “crazy” women as the number of beds that can be fitted
lows . . . . There is one bathroom with two (door-less, of course)
compartments . . . and never, never any privacy at all. It is also a
3
where patients are instantly robbed of credibility.

many
in altoilet
place

Nevertheless, surprisingly little litigation has taken place over
searches of psychiatric patients. One recent case, however, suggests
4
that such claims are likely to be unsuccessful. In Serna v. Goodno, an
entire treatment facility of “sexually dangerous persons” was subject
*
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J.D., 2011, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2006, Swarthmore College. Many
thanks to Professor Stephanos Bibas and the editors of the Journal of Constitutional Law for
their assistance in preparing this Comment, as well as to my family and friends for their
support.
See, e.g., Letter from Benton J. Campbell, U.S. Attorney, E.D.N.Y., & Loretta King, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor of N.Y.C,
(Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
KCHC_findlet_01-30-09.pdf (noting “serious . . . sanitation issues” and other dangerous
conditions in a public New York psychiatric hospital); see also Civil Rights Div. Special Litig. Sec., Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#CRIPA%20Findings%20Letters
(last visited May 11, 2011) (listing recent Department of Justice investigations of substandard conditions in mental health facilities in Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, California, Vermont, and North Carolina).
E.g., Joseph O’Reilly & Bruce Sales, Privacy for the Institutionalized Mentally Ill: Are CourtOrdered Standards Effective?, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 49–51 (1987).
Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1315 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Ann Roy, Escape, in
MADNESS NETWORK NEWS READER 18, 21 (Sherry Hirsch et al. eds., 1974)).
Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 465 (2009).
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5

to visual body cavity searches because hospital staff suspected the
6
presence of a cellular phone in the ward. These suspicionless
searches were found to be “reasonable” under Bell v. Wolfish, which
approved post-visitation visual body cavity searches of pretrial detainees, due to security concerns related to the possibility of accessing
7
child pornography or contacting potential new victims. Thus, the
Eighth Circuit set an alarming precedent: No individualized suspicion whatsoever is required for even intrusive body searches of the
involuntarily committed.
Others have argued that in light of Safford v. Redding, the Serna
court misconstrued Bell by not putting enough weight on the availa8
bility of less invasive alternatives to the searches at issue. Serna’s corollary holding that Bell imposes no individualized suspicion re9
quirement is also an issue on which federal circuit opinions diverge.
But even conceding that the Serna court interpreted Bell correctly, the
Eighth Circuit based its comparison of pretrial detainees and the involuntarily committed on several questionable premises. The court’s
reliance on the Supreme Court’s and its own prior comparisons of
the involuntarily committed and pretrial detainees is misleading in
light of these precedents’ holdings. The uncertain distinction between the standards articulated in Bell and Hudson v. Palmer, which
governs searches of convicted prisoners, undermines the claim that
Bell is sufficient to ensure that the involuntarily committed are
treated better than convicted prisoners, as they are entitled. Most
importantly, research findings belie the court’s assumptions that a
civil commitment determination is a good proxy for what risk an individual poses to institutional security, and that the involuntarily
committed and pretrial detainees are comparable in terms of dangerousness.
5

6
7
8

9

Id. at 946. As the Serna court described visual body cavity searches, “staff ask[] each patient to lift his genitals. Staff also instruct[] each patient to turn, bend over slightly, and
spread his buttocks. There [is] no physical contact with the patients during the
searches.” Id. at 947.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 952–53, 955.
See Alexis Alvarez, Note, A Reasonable Search for Constitutional Protection in Serna v. Goodno:
Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Fourth Amendment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 363, 377–89
(2010); see also Safford v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009) (“[T]he T.L.O. concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a
search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.”).
Gabriel M. Helmer, Note, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 262–79 (2001); see also infra note 37 (discussing circuit split).
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This Comment therefore argues that allowing suspicionless
searches at intake and after visitation, while otherwise requiring reasonable suspicion, is more consistent with both the legal status of the
involuntarily committed and empirical findings on their dangerousness. This proposal balances the traditional Fourth Amendment demand of individualized suspicion, the needs of hospital administrators, and the rights of involuntarily committed patients more fairly.
Furthermore, some research on institutional violence suggests that a
framework based on individualized suspicion would not be administratively unfeasible, and that such determinations could be reviewed
in a way that shows deference to administrative judgment of security
risks.
Part I will discuss the Fourth Amendment as applied to convicted
prisoners, pretrial detainees, and the civilly committed. Part II will
outline the role of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III will discuss the legal status of the involuntarily
committed, particularly precedents comparing the involuntarily
committed and pretrial detainees, and civilly committed patients’
right to be free from punishment. Part IV will discuss the role of
dangerousness in legal standards for civil commitment. Part V will
discuss institutional concerns, including institutional violence and
how individualized suspicion may be reconciled with the requirement
that courts defer to the judgment of mental health professionals in
Fourth Amendment analysis.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN PRISONS AND MENTAL HOSPITALS
A. Convicted Prisoners: Hudson v. Palmer
Convicted prisoners retain any constitutional “rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or . . . objectives of in10
carceration.” Hudson, however, held that prisoners do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells under the Fourth
11
Amendment. In light of their confinement and the “needs and objectives of penal institutions,” society does not recognize any subjec12
tive expectations of privacy prisoners continue to hold as legitimate.
Any search of their cells or belongings will therefore not be reviewed
for reasonableness because when an individual possesses no legiti10
11
12

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (citing examples of free speech and exercise
of religion, due process, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment).
Id. at 526.
Id.

1438

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:5

mate expectation of privacy, an intrusion is not a “search” within the
13
term’s meaning under the Fourth Amendment.
Because searches of inmate property are not subject to the Fourth
Amendment’s limitations, they do not need to be based on individua14
lized suspicion, or, for that matter, reasonable. Even searches solely
to harass inmates are permissible under the Fourth Amendment; indeed, the search at issue in Hudson was performed solely to harass the
15
inmate. If a prisoner is subject to egregious harassment through
searches, the Hudson Court reasoned that he may find a remedy in
16
the Eighth Amendment instead. The Court dismissed the notion
that a neutral search policy or individualized suspicion should be re17
quired in order to prevent harassment of inmates. Randomness is
key to the effectiveness of prison search policies; a neutral plan would
be predictable and would pose a likelihood of prisoners trying to discern the pattern—and succeeding—in order to avoid detection of
18
contraband.
The main objective of incarceration that limits the rights of prisoners, thus allowing for their categorical exclusion from Fourth
19
Amendment protection, is institutional security. The Court pointed
out three significant characteristics of the convicted inmate population that give security concerns precedence in any determination of
prisoners’ rights. First, a criminal conviction represents
a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct . . . a lapse in ability to control and conform . . . behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of selfrestraint . . . [and] an inability to regulate . . . conduct in a way that re20
flects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others.

13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529–30.
Id. at 520. A later case, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 76 (1987), announced any prison regulation is constitutionally “valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Id. at 89; see also Antoine McNamara, Note, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 209, 228 (2007) (explaining the rule that the Court established in
Turner). The Supreme Court has not applied this new standard of review for prisoners’
constitutional claims in a Fourth Amendment case. Id. at 229. Nevertheless, this ruling
would likely not reduce convicted prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights because they are
arguably less robust under Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526, as Turner requires prison regulations
to relate to some prison administration interest.
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529. For a suggestion of how a neutral search policy could also be completely random, see McNamara, supra note 15, at 227.
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524.
Id. at 526.
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In other words, criminal convictions justify a presumption that inmates pose a threat to institutional security because of past inability
to follow rules or prior dangerous behavior. The second salient characteristic of the prison population, which reinforces the first presumption, is the vast evidence showing that violence and contraband
21
have reached epidemic levels in U.S. prisons. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, convicted prisoners are eligible for punishment. A
restrictive regimen is not only consistent but also essential to accomplishing the deterrent, retributive, and correctional aims of the jus22
tice system.
B. Pretrial Detainees: Bell v. Wolfish
Bell articulated the Fourth Amendment standard for searches of
23
pretrial detainees. In Bell, pretrial detainees at a facility also housing
convicted prisoners alleged that their conditions of confinement vi24
olated numerous constitutional provisions. Their Fourth Amendment claim challenged blanket visual body cavity searches after visita25
tion.
The Court found that pretrial detainees retain a greater expecta26
tion of privacy than convicted prisoners. Although convicted prisoners could theoretically receive some Fourth Amendment protection, their rights are circumscribed because incursions on their
21
22

23
24

25

26

Id.
Id. at 524; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1979) (“[C]entral to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections
facilities themselves.” (alteration in original) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823
(1974))).
Bell defined “pretrial detainees” as “persons who have been charged with a crime but who
have not yet been tried on the charge.” 441 U.S. at 523.
The convicted prisoners housed in the facility were awaiting transportation to federal
prison, serving short sentences, or awaiting trials on additional charges. Id. at 524. The
center also housed witnesses in protective custody and persons in contempt of court. Id.
The pretrial detainees also claimed constitutional violations related to “overcrowded
conditions, undue length of confinement . . . inadequate recreational, educational, and
employment opportunities, insufficient staff, and objectionable restrictions on the purchase and receipt of personal items and books.” Id. at 527.
Id. at 558. The inmates also challenged the reasonableness of conducting cell searches
outside of their presence. Id. at 555. The Court held that conducting the searches outside of the inmates’ presence did not pose any additional intrusion beyond that of the
searches themselves, which were not challenged. Id. at 557. The general Fourth
Amendment standard for pretrial detainees that the Court articulated related to the facility’s visual body cavity search policy, so this Comment will only address that claim in detail. Id. at 558.
Id. at 545 (“A fortiori, pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners.”).
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freedom are inherent to, and justified by, the purposes of punish27
ment. In contrast, pretrial detainees have a right to be entirely free
28
from punishment because they have not been convicted of a crime.
Nevertheless, so long as there has been a neutral probable cause de29
termination, the government interest in ensuring presence at trial
and “ultimately . . . service of their sentences” justifies continued de30
tainment.
Detention of pretrial detainees in a prison housing convicted
prisoners invokes an additional strong interest in maintaining prison
order. The Court emphasized that this interest is not diminished by
the detainees’ pretrial rather than convicted status. In a telling footnote, the Court described characteristics of the pretrial population
that create an equally substantial interest in security as there is with
convicted prisoners:
There is no basis for concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser
security risk than convicted inmates. . . . In the federal system, a detainee
is committed to the detention facility only because no other less drastic
means can reasonably assure his presence at trial. As a result, those who
are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who are
charged with serious crimes or who have prior records. They also may
pose a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates. This may be particularly true at [this facility,] . . . where the resident convicted inmates have
been sentenced to only short terms of incarceration and many of the de31
tainees face the possibility of lengthy imprisonment if convicted.

Complementing this interest in institutional order is a policy of deference toward prison authorities’ judgment on issues related to day-to32
day operations. When evaluating any constitutional claim arising
33
from prison conditions, courts will defer to administrators’ expertise
unless the restriction is shown to be an “exaggerated” response to se34
curity concerns.
The Court concluded that a “reasonableness” test that is “not capable of precise definition or mechanical application” governs

27

28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 545–46 (“Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation
of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 285 (1948)).
Bell, 441 U.S. at 534.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–14 (1975), cited in Bell, 441 U.S. at 534.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 534.
Id. at 546 n.28 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 547–48; see, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987).
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (applying the Turner standard of deference to
prison authorities in a First Amendment claim).
Bell, 441 U.S. at 547–48 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
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35

searches of pretrial detainees. Beyond the Court’s invocation of the
three principles above, it listed four factors to be considered: “the
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which [the search] is
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it
36
is conducted.” Although the Court described this holding as simply
answering the question of “whether visual body-cavity inspections . . . can ever be conducted on less than probable cause,” notably
absent from its analysis is an explicit requirement of individualized
37
suspicion. Without any requirement of individualized suspicion, the
reasonableness test, coupled with the Court’s admonition in Hudson
that abusive searches of pretrial detainees were intolerable, makes the
only practical difference between the Fourth Amendment protections
of prisoners and pretrial detainees a ban on harassing searches of
pretrial detainees. This is particularly true in light of the Court’s failure to quantify the scope of a pretrial detainee’s legitimate expectation of privacy, thus providing no indication as to how much weight
individual privacy concerns are to receive when balanced against in38
stitutional safety and deference to prison authorities.

35
36
37

38

Id. at 559.
Id.
Helmer, supra note 9, at 262 (“[I]n his Bell concurrence, Justice Powell confirmed that
the majority failed to articulate a level of cause required to strip search a detainee . . . .”);
see also Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (“If the [Bell] majority had
required reasonable suspicion for body cavity inspection strip searches of pretrial detainees, Justice Powell would not have dissented at all.”). The majority approach among the
federal circuits interprets Bell as requiring some individualized suspicion because of its
ambiguous characterization of the search in question as on “less than probable cause”
and the presence of some suspicion in the facts of the case. Helmer, supra note 9, at 262–
65. The plaintiff in Serna argued for this interpretation, also relying on a prior Eighth
Circuit ruling requiring reasonable suspicion for visual body cavity searches of misdemeanor detainees. Brief of Appellant at 26, Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir.
2009) (No. 05-3441); see also Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741–42 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that a strip search of a misdemeanor detainee was unjustified under Bell in the absence of reasonable suspicion of the presence of weapons or contraband). Because the
Eighth Circuit, citing Powell, 541 F.3d at 1298, adopted the suspicionless balancing test interpretation of Bell in its disposition of Serna, 567 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 2009), I will rely
on this interpretation in my analysis of psychiatric hospital searches. Needless to say, if
individualized suspicion were required for searches of all pretrial detainees, there would
be no question of its requirement in searches of civilly committed patients.
Helmer, supra note 9, at 260 (“[T]he Bell Court is unclear about what rights exist and the
importance of those rights. . . . Justice Rehnquist’s silence on the importance of the individual interest appears to end the balancing test without putting the weight of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights on the scale.”).
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C. Involuntarily Committed Patients: Serna v. Goodno
Plaintiff Serna was involuntarily committed as a “sexually danger39
ous person” through the Minnesota Sex Offender Program. Commitment to this program occurs when a “district court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the patient is a sexual psychopathic
personality . . . evidencing ‘an utter lack of power to control . . . sexual impulses’ and who ‘is likely to engage in acts of harm40
ful sexual conduct.’” The purposes of these commitments are “to
provide care and treatment” and “teach detainees how to control
their dangerous sexual behaviors so that they can eventually return to
41
the community.” In three years of confinement, Serna had not pos42
sessed any contraband.
The incident leading to the searches at issue was the discovery of a
cellular phone carrying case in a common room open to patients,
43
44
staff, and some visitors. A search of the area found no phone. A
surveillance video showed specific patients who had recently been in
45
the area, but not who had dropped the case. Hospital staff then
immediately commenced room and visual body cavity searches of the
46
entire facility. Serna only challenged the visual body cavity searches,
which he claimed were unreasonable because the staff had no basis
on which to suspect him of possessing the cellular phone and did not
limit their search to patients who had been in the common area or
47
possessed contraband in the past. The facility countered that it had
the right to perform blanket visual body cavity searches in response to
48
any “generalized suspicion of contraband.”
The Eighth Circuit asserted that in Andrews v. Neer, it had set forth
the Fourth Amendment standard for seizures in psychiatric hospitals:
objective reasonableness, the same as that applied to pretrial detai49
nees. The primary basis for imposing the same search standard for
both groups was the similarity of institutional concerns over “safety
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48
49

Serna, 567 F.3d at 946.
Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted).
Serna, 567 F.3d at 946 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 947.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“Administrators did not focus their search efforts on the patients identified in the
surveillance tape or on patients with a recent history of possessing cell phones or other
contraband.”).
Id.
See id. at 948 (citing Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001)).
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and security of guards,” “order,” and “efficiency of . . . operations.”
The court noted that the government’s justifications for confining
each group are “similar”: suspects are detained before trial “if ‘no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure . . . the
safety of any other person and the community,’” and a person may be
committed as a sexually dangerous person on a finding of “future
51
dangerousness.” The court also likened its comparison of pretrial
detainees and the civilly committed to that in Youngberg v. Romeo,
where the Supreme Court made a similar analogy in determining civil
committees’ liberty interests in substantive due process claims regard52
ing conditions of confinement in psychiatric institutions. Based on
its ruling in Andrews and the similarities between pretrial detainees
and civil committees, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the same
Fourth Amendment standard should apply to both groups and that
53
Bell therefore governs searches of the involuntarily committed.
Deferring to the hospital administrators’ judgment, the court
found that the searches were reasonable under the Bell standard despite their suspicionless application and the court’s concern over the
54
immediate resort to such intrusive methods. Consistent with Bell,
the court noted the facility’s concern that cellular phones would allow patients to contact past or future victims, access child pornogra55
phy, or transmit photographs of the facilities to aid in escape. The
staff had also found evidence that a contraband phone was in the facility, which had experienced security issues related to cellular
phones in the past. Thus “concrete information and not merely . . . ‘perceived security concerns’” justified the searches, making
56
them reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
II. SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Searches of patients’ persons such as those in Serna are likely the
only psychiatric hospital searches that traditional Fourth Amendment
doctrine does not cover. Most courts would find that civilly committed patients do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
belongings while in the hospital, thus removing searches of their

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1); Hince v. Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577, 588 (Minn. 2001)).
Id. at 949; see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1982).
Serna, 567 F.3d at 949.
Id. at 954–55.
Id. at 953.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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property from the Fourth Amendment’s coverage. Moreover, if law
enforcement could perform a particular warrantless search, such as a
Terry frisk, it would be presumptively reasonable for hospital staff to
do so because they have more leeway than law enforcement under
58
the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, depending on their intrusiveness, searches by hospital staff where there is at least reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing or possession of contraband may be constitutional. It is suspicionless searches of a patient’s person by hospital
staff that are questionable, as law enforcement could not perform
59
such a search under nearly any circumstances. Because they are unrelated to law enforcement, the “reasonableness” prong of the Fourth
Amendment governs the constitutionality of these searches under either the “special needs” doctrine or what some commentators have
60
described as the “reduced expectation of privacy” doctrine.
57

58

59

60



See John B. Wefing, The Performance of the New Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century: New Cast, Same Script, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 802 (2003) (describing
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s “willingness to give defendants substantially more protection than that afforded under the federal constitution or guaranteed in most other
states” in State v. Stott, which found the involuntarily committed retain an expectation of
privacy in their belongings); see also State v. Stott, 794 A.2d 120, 127–28 (N.J. 2002) (finding that involuntarily committed psychiatric patients have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their hospital rooms, even when those rooms are shared with other patients).
See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Hospital as Within Constitutional Provision Forbidding Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 28 A.L.R. 6TH 245 (2007) (recounting cases that
have held no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in hospital rooms).
See, e.g., Stott, 794 A.2d at 124, 132 (noting without objection that “hospital staff personnel
regularly search the patients’ rooms, including their wardrobes,” and arguing that “[t]he
participation of law enforcement officers transformed this search from what might have
been an objectively reasonable intrusion by hospital staff into the kind of warrantless police action prohibited by our federal and State Constitutions”); Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth
Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless
Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 758 (2007) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly suggested that
whether criminal proceedings are likely to result is an important consideration in deciding the legality or reasonableness of a suspicionless search.”).
See Bascuas, supra note 58, at 758 (“‘Ordinary’ searches—those that arise in a criminal
investigation—are still held to require some degree of individualized suspicion, whether
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”). But see id. at 758–59 (“[T]he Court has allowed evidence from suspicionless checkpoints to support felony prosecutions . . . . The
searches in those cases were justified as being necessary to fulfill some professed government ‘special need’ . . . .”); Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a
Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 888–89 (2010) (“[T]o state that the purpose of the search
is distinct from the ‘normal need for law enforcement’ is merely a semantic game because
the special need that justifies the weaker search standard is usually nothing more than the
policy justification for the original criminalization of the conduct. . . . In this sense, the
suspicionless search jurisprudence is little more than an exercise in redefining the nature
of criminal activity and thereby redefining the permissible methods of detecting that activity.”).
See Derek Regensburger, DNA Databases and the Fourth Amendment: The Time Has Come to
Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant Requirement and the Primary Purpose Test,
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61

A. The Camara-Terry Balancing Test

The balancing inquiries of the special needs and reduced expecta62
tion of privacy doctrines originated in Terry v. Ohio and Camara v.
63
Municipal Court of San Francisco. Terry introduced a focus on the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment and created a new category of searches subject to neither the warrant nor probable cause
64
requirements. A contemporaneous case, Camara, was crucial to the
65
Terry Court’s holding. While still requiring a judicially issued warrant, Camara held that warrants for a building inspection could be is66
sued on less than probable cause. Under Camara, a search may be
reasonable where a valid government interest—in Camara, universal
67
compliance with the housing code—justifies the intrusion. In Terry,
the Court further emphasized Camara’s assertion that “there is no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search . . . against the invasion which the
68
search . . . entails.”
The impact of Camara and Terry was to introduce an interestbalancing inquiry into Fourth Amendment analysis in lieu of a strict
distinction between non-searches, searches requiring warrants and
probable cause, and categorical exceptions to the warrant require-

61

62

63

64

65
66
67
68

19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 319, 343 (2009) (distinguishing between special needs searches
and searches where individuals had lessened expectations of privacy due to involvement
with the criminal justice system); Simmons, supra note 59, at 855 (“Courts have . . . used
the ‘reasonableness’ language [of the Fourth Amendment] to support exceptions to this
general rule [of requiring a warrant and probable cause].”).
I adopt this term from Wayne R. LaFave’s treatise on search and seizure. E.g., 4 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6(g) (4th ed.
2004).
392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968) (finding that preserving the security of police officers is a special
concern justifying minimal “protective searches” of a suspect’s outer garments when he or
she is taken into custody, and outweighing a suspect’s expectation of privacy).
387 U.S. 523, 531–33 (1967) (finding that an individual’s expectation of privacy in private
property is not outweighed by needs of administrative officials to perform a warrantless
inspection of the property justified by time, infeasibility of obtaining a warrant, or minimal nature of demands on occupants).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct . . . which
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure.”); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 395–96, 401–02 (1988) (describing the reasonableness balancing test developed in Camara and Terry for use in “stop-and-frisk” procedures).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 523, 534–35, 536–37).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
Id.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (citing, inter alia, Camara, 387 U.S. at 536–37).
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69

ment. Between non-searches and searches requiring a warrant falls
a category of searches allowed based on “a balancing of interests
where the search or seizure at issue constitutes only a minimal intru70
sion.” Camara also extended the protection of the Fourth Amendment to non-criminal enforcement activities, which in turn widened
the government interests that may weigh in favor of such an intrusion
71
beyond law enforcement.
B. Special Needs and Reduced Expectation of Privacy Searches
Special needs searches, loosely defined, are searches whose “primary purpose” is something other than collection of evidence for
72
Justice Blackmun coined this term in his
criminal prosecutions.
73
concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., though the reach of this doctrine has extended far beyond Blackmun’s likely intended meaning
to encompass such disparate scenarios as “railroad workers, Customs
74
Department employees, and school children,” among others. If a
non-law-enforcement purpose is identified, courts evaluate the
search’s reasonableness under a balancing test that “undertake[s] a
context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and
75
public interests advanced by the parties.”
Notably, the Supreme Court recently may have created a separate
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements for proba76
77
tioners and parolees. In Samson v. California, the Court did not re69
70
71
72

73

74

75
76
77

4 LAFAVE, supra note 61, § 9.1.
3 LAFAVE, supra note 61, § 5.4(c).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
E.g., Simmons, supra note 59, at 887–88 (“The Court uses different language in different
contexts—the search must not be ‘aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime’; it must
serve ‘special needs[] beyond the normal need for law enforcement;’ or it must fulfill a
purpose other than ‘general crime control’ but the requirement itself remains constant.”
(alteration in original)). The “primary purpose” test is criticized for its malleability, suggesting that conclusively defining the special needs category of searches is difficult. See,
e.g., Bascuas, supra note 58, at 757, 759 (arguing that the “primary purpose” test creates
“arbitrary” results and “can provide a convenient pretext for circumventing any requirement of individualized suspicion”).
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless
Search and Seizure Quagmire: The Supreme Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another
Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419, 449–50, 454, 459–60 (2007) (describing the creation of the “special needs” test and its eventual adoption by the Court).
Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 449–50, 454, 459–60 (arguing that Blackmun intended to
limit the cases in which a balancing test could be used only to those where obtaining a
warrant would not be feasible).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
See, e.g., Regensburger, supra note 60, at 354.
547 U.S. 848, 857 (2006).
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quire a non-law-enforcement purpose for the searches at issue and
explicitly noted that it was not deciding the cases under the special
78
needs doctrine. Whether this case marks a total abandonment of
the special needs doctrine, creates an exception for searches of any
individuals with a “diminished” expectation of privacy, or creates a
79
distinct category for probationers and parolees remains to be seen.
Regardless, the Court applied the same interest-balancing in these
cases as it has in the special needs cases, although without requiring a
special government need before moving to this analysis. The Court
also noted the reduced expectations of privacy of parolees and probationers when weighing their interests against the government’s to
find suspicionless searches reasonable, but a diminished expectation
of privacy has been a characteristic of many, if not most, groups sub80
ject to special needs searches. Therefore, whether searches of the
involuntarily committed fall in this or the special needs category is irrelevant to the ultimate analysis.
C. Individualized Suspicion
Traditionally, reasonableness was thought to demand some degree of individualized suspicion because of the Fourth Amendment’s
81
roots in the colonists’ distaste for general warrants. The introduction of the interest-balancing framework in Camara and Terry signifi-

78
79

80

81

Id. at 852 n.3; Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 492–93; Regensburger, supra note 60, at 355.
See Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 492 (“If it seems radical to suggest the Court should abandon its fairly recently developed special needs doctrine and primary purpose test when
evaluating suspicionless searches and seizures, one answer is that it may already have
done so.”); Regensburger, supra note 60, at 356 (“[Samson and United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112 (2001),] seem to signal an end to the special needs analysis where the subject of
the search has a reduced expectation of privacy, reverting back to Justice White’s application of the balancing test from T.L.O.”).
Regensburger, supra note 60, at 355–56; see also Simmons, supra note 59, at 866–67
(“[J]ust like the schoolchildren in T.L.O. and the heavily regulated businesses in Camara,
the Court noted [in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987),] that office workers
have a diminished expectation of privacy in their workplace.”).
Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of
Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 527 (1995) (“The historical abuses associated
with search and seizure practices involved broad grants of official authority pursuant to a
general warrant. General warrants were the perceived evil.”); see also Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 510 (1965) (“Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans
were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the
Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket authority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of
the British tax laws.”).
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82

cantly relaxed the individualized suspicion requirement. In some
recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has reemphasized that individualized suspicion is the norm and that suspicionless searches are
83
limited exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. This suggests that
while individualized suspicion is not an “irreducible” component of
reasonableness, a special need may not automatically defeat the pre84
sumption that it is required. Yet predicting when individualized
suspicion is required for these searches is a difficult task; various
85
commentators have noted that the Court’s decisions are “ad hoc,”
86
produce “unpredictable and illogical results,” and that the doctrine
87
is in a “state of disarray.”
While this doctrinal confusion is beyond the scope of this Comment, some common characteristics of the cases in which individualized suspicion has not been required have been noted: “[A] limited
intrusion on privacy, reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the subjects, and the fact that imposing a warrant requirement would
88
be impractical and would frustrate the government purpose.”
Searches of psychiatric facilities clearly meet the third and second criteria, but searches of patients’ persons—much less visual body cavity
89
searches like those in Serna—clearly are not “limited intrusion[s].”
In fact, Bell is the only case where a suspicionless strip-search has ever
been permitted, and even suspicionless searches of the home have
been limited to cases where the subjects are “convicted criminals un90
der state supervision.” In addition, although they are, in a sense,
82

83

84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Clancy, supra note 81, at 533 (“[T]he Court has abandoned any pretense . . . that individualized suspicion remains the preferred model for any searches and seizures to be reasonable.”); see also id. at 546–47.
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. While such
suspicion is not an ‘irreducible’ component of reasonableness we have recognized only
limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply.”) (citations omitted);
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (“The Fourth Amendment . . . generally bars
officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion. Searches
conducted without grounds for suspicion of particular individuals have been upheld,
however, in ‘certain limited circumstances.’” (citation omitted)).
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 434.
Bascuas, supra note 58, at 723.
Simmons, supra note 59, at 887.
Id. at 867–68.
Simmons, supra note 59, at 867; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
Jessica R. Feierman & Riya S. Shah, Protecting Personhood: Legal Strategies to Combat the Use of
Strip Searches on Youth in Detention, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 67, 78 & n.87 (2007); cf. Kaaryn
Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 708 (2009)
(“[O]utside of parolees and probationers, the special needs exception had never . . . been extended so far as to allow government searches of individuals’ homes.”).
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searches of the body, the Court has also consistently portrayed the in91
vasion drug tests pose “as minimal or even ‘negligible.’”
Serna thus represents a departure in suspicionless search doctrine
by allowing a highly intrusive search method without individualized
suspicion outside the criminal justice context. Such a deviation may
be warranted, but it should be so only if there are strong justifications
to group involuntary civil commitments in the same category as those
under criminal supervision—namely, pretrial detainees. The remaining Parts argue that the Eighth Circuit’s justifications in this regard
are unconvincing.
III. LEGAL STATUS OF THE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED: CRITICISM OF
SERNA’S INTERPRETATION
A. Use of Force and Conditions of Confinement Precedents: Andrews and
Youngberg
Although the Fourth Amendment standard for the civilly committed was an issue of first impression in Serna, the court argued that
precedent required psychiatric patients to be treated as pretrial de92
tainees. Civil committees’ Fourth Amendment claims, however, are
distinguishable from the cases that the Serna opinion discusses.
While these cases provide some support for comparing the civilly
committed and pretrial detainees, they do not mandate it. If these
cases are not controlling, requiring some individualized suspicion in
psychiatric hospital searches is possible.
On closer examination, Andrews does not seem to impose a Fourth
93
Amendment standard for civil committees. As the opinion pointed
out, the Fourth Amendment applies to arrestees’ excessive force
claims, whereas pretrial detainees must bring due process claims
94
against excessive force. Although grounded in separate constitutional rights, both groups’ claims are evaluated under the same stan95
dard: objective reasonableness. It was therefore immaterial wheth91

92
93
94

95

Feierman & Shah, supra note 90, at 78 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 823
(2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
626 (1989)).
See Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 948–49 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 165
(2009).
See id. at 948; Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1051, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2001).
Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1060 (“[E]valuation of excessive-force claims brought by pre-trial
detainees . . . [is] grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the
Fourth Amendment.”).
Id. at 1061.
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er civil committees were compared to arrestees or pretrial detainees
in Andrews, so long as the court chose objective reasonableness over
the less protective Eighth Amendment standard for cruel and un96
usual punishment.
The question in Andrews, therefore, was which Amendment covers
claims of excessive force in a psychiatric hospital, not how to apply
97
the Fourth Amendment to psychiatric patients. In equating pretrial
detainees’ and psychiatric patients’ excessive force claims, the Andrews court found that civil committees’ excessive force claims are re98
ally due process claims. Nevertheless, one of the Serna court’s most
forceful arguments was the need to apply a consistent Fourth
Amendment standard to both searches and seizures of psychiatric pa99
tients. Because it did not actually put forth a Fourth Amendment
seizure standard for civil committees in Andrews, however, the Serna
court could have adopted a different search standard without risking
this inconsistency.
The Eight Circuit’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s analogy between pretrial detainees and the civilly committed in Youngberg is si100
milarly erroneous. Youngberg held that “restrictions on [the] liberty” of any civilly confined person must be “reasonably related to
legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punish101
ment.”
Youngberg’s comparison of the two groups therefore does
not require that they be treated identically. In fact, Youngberg mandates that the groups’ rights differ according to the purposes of their
102
confinement.
Youngberg accords the civilly committed rights to
freedom from unreasonable restraints and to “minimally adequate
training” beyond those of pretrial detainees because the purpose of
96

97
98
99
100
101
102

See id. at 1060–61; see also Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2009) (“In
some contexts, such as claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs, the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment standards are essentially interchangeable. But the distinction
between the two constitutional protections assumes some importance for excessive force
claims because the Due Process Clause, which prohibits all ‘punishment,’ affords broader
protection than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against only punishment that is
‘cruel and unusual.’ (citations omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875
(7th Cir.1996))). But see Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience
Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 329 (2010) (“Despite the distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted felons drawn by the Supreme Court, most appellate courts have required detainees alleging excessive force [under the Due Process Clause] . . . to meet the
same standard that convicted felons must meet under the Eighth Amendment.”).
Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1060.
Id. at 1060–61.
Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 165 (2009).
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1982); Serna, 567 F.3d at 949.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.
See id. at 320–22.
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their confinement is “custodial care or compulsory treatment” as op103
posed to warehousing until trial.
B. The Right to Be Free from Punishment
Civil detainees face a heavy burden in challenging punitive condi104
Nevertheless, courts reviewing these chaltions of confinement.
lenges have consistently emphasized Youngberg’s holding that a confined person not convicted of a crime is entitled to better treatment
105
than a convicted prisoner.
This is particularly true for psychiatric
patients, the purpose of whose confinement is not only incapacitation
106
but also treatment.
Despite the difficulty of showing that conditions of confinement
amount to punishment, the relevance of the right to be free from
punishment in Fourth Amendment analysis should not turn on
whether a search or seizure practice is so egregious as to be puni107
tive. Rather, the right to be free from punishment requires civil detainees to receive more Fourth Amendment protection than in a
108
criminal setting. If a civil committee may not be “confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than . . . his criminal counterparts,” then he should not be as subject to searches and
109
seizures.
Courts that have applied a pretrial detainee standard to
civil detainees’ excessive force or seizure claims have relied on pre-

103

104

105
106

107
108

109

Id. at 321–22, 324 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)); see also Eric S.
Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually
Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 327 (2003) (arguing that civilly committed sexually
violent predators have rights to “substantially more than . . . mere warehousing”).
See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (rejecting “as applied” ex post facto
and double jeopardy challenges to conditions of civil confinement). See generally Janus &
Logan, supra note 103 (detailing the difficulties of challenging civil confinement conditions on substantive due process grounds, and proposing that civilly committed sex offenders have rights to “more than . . . warehousing” in spite of Seling v. Young).
E.g., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Youngberg, 457
U.S. at 322).
Janus & Logan, supra note 103, at 345, 347 (arguing that the police commitment power
may not be invoked absent a right to treatment); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty:
Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 385 n.55, 386
(1982) (summarizing federal courts’ stance on and the extent of scholarly argument
about institutionalized persons’ right to treatment).
See Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2001).
See Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 99–100, 102 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting the shocks the
conscience standard in favor of a Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard
for involuntarily committed patients’ excessive force claims because they are “in the
state’s custody because of mental illness, not culpable conduct”); Andrews, 253 F.3d at
1061.
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004).
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cisely this reasoning, likening civil commitment to pretrial detention
because the excessive force standard for pretrial detainees prohibits a
110
wider range of seizures than the Eighth Amendment.
While the Serna court commented that there is no reason to apply
different standards for searches and seizures, comparing searches of
civil detainees to pretrial detainees is a poor fit because of the lesser
111
distinction between the protections for each group. The difference
between application of the Bell standard for searches of pretrial detainees and the Hudson standard for convicted prisoners is unclear.
For both groups, suspicionless searches related to security justifications are permissible and harassment is not. Although the Hudson
standard indirectly allows harassment by denying prison inmates any
Fourth Amendment protection, the Eighth Amendment may protect
112
prisoners from harassing searches unrelated to prison security. Indeed, that deference to institutional decision-making and the invocation of institutional security mandated the outcome in Serna despite
the court’s concerns over immediate resort to intrusive, blanket
113
searches demonstrates the difficulty plaintiffs face in challenging
search practices that fall short of harassment under Bell. Furthermore, even if Bell prohibits some searches that both Hudson and the
Eighth Amendment would allow for prisoners, from the patient’s
perspective, frequent blanket searches for security purposes bear little difference from searches conducted solely for harassment; either
114
way, the intrusion feels unjustified because of a lack of wrongdoing.
Serna therefore prevents the involuntarily committed from using the
Fourth Amendment to ensure their conditions of confinement vis-à110
111

112

113

114

Davis, 264 F.3d at 99–100, 102; Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1061.
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 529–30 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect prisoners because they retain no legitimate expectation of privacy, and
that the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment provide their only recourse
against harassment); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 949–50 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the Bell reasonableness test imposes no individualized suspicion requirement (citing
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 563 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting in part)).
See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520, 529–30 (“Our holding that respondent does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy enabling him to invoke the protections of the Fourth
Amendment does not mean that he is without a remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs. . . . The Eighth Amendment always stands as a protection against
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”); Serna, 567 F.3d at 950–51.
The court further contended that the manner in which the searches were conducted
supported their reasonableness. Serna, 567 F.3d at 955 (noting that the searches were
“conducted privately, safely, and professionally”). A complete analysis of the legal or constitutional significance of the manner in which searches are conducted in Fourth
Amendment claims is outside the scope of this Comment.
Cf. Butterfoss, supra note 73, at 487 (“As a law abiding citizen . . . [i]t is no comfort to me
that the government intrusion is merely for a ‘regulatory’ purpose.”).
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vis searches are better than those of prisoners, to which their civil de115
tainee status entitles them.
This reasoning, however, could be interpreted to require courts
automatically to increase the Fourth Amendment rights of the civilly
committed if the rights of prisoners are expanded. For example, if
the Supreme Court overruled Hudson and required reasonable suspicion for prison searches, civil committees could argue for requiring
probable cause or warrants before a search. This outcome is obviously unacceptable if courts are required to prohibit search practices
that are appropriate to the institutional setting and without which security would be severely compromised.
The fear of formalistically having to expand psychiatric patients’
Fourth Amendment rights to an absurd degree to maintain their difference from prisoners, however, is more a hypothetical than a serious possibility. It is unlikely that convicted prisoners’ right to privacy will ever be expanded much beyond Hudson because of their
eligibility for punishment as well as the ongoing, serious security
116
problems of prisons.
Even if prisoners’ rights were expanded in
such a way that affording the civilly committed more protection
would be completely impracticable, this is not the case with merely
requiring individualized suspicion in searches of their persons.
Moreover, courts that have addressed Fourth Amendment seizures,
excessive force claims, and other challenges to confinement conditions in psychiatric hospitals agree with this reasoning and have not
indicated that formalistic overexpansion of the rights of the civilly
117
committed is a significant concern.
IV. DANGEROUSNESS AND CIVIL COMMITMENT LEGAL STANDARDS
Serna’s comparison of the dangerousness of the civilly committed
to the dangerousness of pretrial detainees is tenuous. Serna is correct
that they are nominally similar: a finding of “dangerousness” is required for most categories of civil mental health. Its reliance on civil
commitment dangerousness findings, however, is a poor fit with
Fourth Amendment reasoning.
Implicit in the court’s comparison is a reference to the Hudson
and Bell language asserting that the legal status of prisoners and pre115
116
117

See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1982); see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d
913, 932 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932; Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 99–101 (1st Cir. 2001); Andrews v.
Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001).
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trial detainees justifies the inference that they pose an actual dan118
That is, a criminal conviction, or pending charges coupled
ger.
with a finding of dangerousness, suggests that someone is likely to be
a security risk in the prison setting, thus making blanket searches of
119
these populations reasonable. But while the sexually violent predators in Serna were committed under a statutory finding of dangerousness, this is not a requirement in many mental health commitments.
In addition, although there may be enough overlap between criminal
convictions or charges and a real risk of danger to defend a blanket
presumption, the connection is less convincing with regard to mental
health commitments both because of what qualifies as “dangerousness” and how difficult dangerous behavior in psychiatric patients is
to predict.
A. The Incompatibility of Fourth Amendment Analysis and Legal Criteria for
Civil Commitment
Civil commitment of the mentally ill may occur under either the
police or parens patriae powers. Involuntary civil commitment originated under the parens patriae power, which allows the state to hold
120
and forcibly treat the mentally ill for their own well-being.
Under
the police power, the state may also detain the mentally ill in the pub121
lic interest to prevent them from harming themselves or others. As
the deinstitutionalization movement and constitutional limitations on
commitment of the 1960s and 1970s introduced a more legalistic civil
commitment process, the police power took precedence as the basis
122
for most psychiatric commitments.
However, presence of a parens patriae or police power justification
does not automatically give the government the power to confine. A
mentally ill person who poses no risk to himself or others may not be
123
confined simply because treatment would be in his best interest.
Likewise, while a dangerously mentally ill person may be confined
even if he is untreatable, the state may not confine a dangerous per-

118
119
120
121
122

123

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 n.28 (1979).
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 529; Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 n.28.
Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207–
10 (1974).
Id. at 1222–23.
See Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 120, at 1205 (“Recent statutory enactments appear to indicate a trend toward restricting involuntary civil commitment to the
dangerous mentally ill and toward limiting the type and increasing the severity of harm
necessary to support a finding of dangerousness.”); Rhoden, supra note 106, at 386–87.
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
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son who has neither a mental disorder nor been convicted of a crime,
124
An individual must be
even if it would be in the public interest.
both mentally ill and exhibit “legally relevant behavior” for his civil
125
confinement to be legitimate.
More importantly, there must be a
126
causal connection between the two.
There are civil commitment mechanisms in addition to the traditional findings of mental illness and danger to oneself or others. A
criminal defendant may be committed if he is incompetent to stand
trial—incapable of consulting with his lawyer or rationally understanding the charges and proceedings, or, put more simply, of “assist127
ing in preparing his defense.”
An incompetent defendant may be
held for a “reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether
128
there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity.”
Many states, however, continue to allow indefinite commitments of
the incompetent without a finding of dangerousness, even though
129
Jackson v. Indiana held it unconstitutional.
A person found not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) may also
be civilly committed not only after an acquittal for minor charges, but
also for longer than the maximum prison sentence for the underlying
130
offense. A state may confine an NGRI acquittee until he is no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous—even if confinement turns
131
out to be permanent. The Supreme Court has held, however, that
the proof of the elements of a criminal offense required to raise the
affirmative defense of insanity is enough to show that an individual is

124

125
126
127

128

129

130
131

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992). But see id. at 87–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee
who has regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of
detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee’s continuing dangerousness.”); Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
HARV. L. REV. 605, 607 n.8 (1981).
Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 193 (1999).
Id.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960); see also Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Incompetency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV.
921, 923–25 (1985).
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Commitment may be extended if there is a
dangerousness finding after the defendant may no longer be held for the purpose of ascertaining competency. Id.
Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 204 (2000) (“Astonishingly, more than half the states allow for the indefinite commitment of incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants, in spite of Jackson’s specific language outlawing this
practice.”).
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992); Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
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132

sufficiently dangerous to be committed. Dangerousness is not synonymous with violence in the civil commitment context but also may
133
include non-violent antisocial conduct. In contrast to competency,
therefore, insanity acquittees may be committed automatically on the
basis of their NGRI verdict, without an additional finding of dange134
rousness. In addition, states may later place the burden on the de135
fendant to prove he is no longer dangerous enough to be confined.
Finally, an increasing number of individuals are civilly committed
136
The Minnesota staas “sexually dangerous” or “sexually violent.”
137
tute in Serna is typical, requiring commitment after completion of a
criminal sentence for a sex offense if clear and convincing evidence
shows a “lack of power to control . . . sexual impulses
and . . . [likelihood of continuing] to engage in acts of harmful sex138
ual conduct.”
Sexual offenses leading to eligibility for these commitments need not be physically violent, however, or even particularly
139
serious.
Yet the Supreme Court approved these types of commit140
141
ments in Kansas v. Hendricks and later Kansas v. Crane on the basis
of the requirement that an offender is dangerous and has a “mental
abnormalit[y] . . . that inhibit[s] self-control”—even when that “men-

132
133
134
135
136

137

138
139

140
141

Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 365 n.14.
Id. at 365–67.
Cf. id. at 355–57, 370 (upholding a statute requiring an insanity acquittee to prove by a
preponderance that he is not mentally ill and dangerous to be eligible for release).
E.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 302, 120
Stat. 587, 620 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006)) (“If, after the hearing, the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous person, the
court shall commit the person . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (2010) (“[T]he general assembly finds that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of
the sexually violent predator is necessary.”). For a history of sex offender commitment
statutes, see Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Note, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil Commitment of
Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2229, 2235–39 (2003).
MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (2010); see Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 880–81 (8th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied 130 S. Ct.
165 (2009).
Senty-Haugen, 462 F.3d at 880.
E.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2008) (including any criminal act committed “for the
purpose of the defendant’s sexual gratification” in the list of offenses creating eligibility
for sexually violent predator commitment); see also Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough,
Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil.html (“Sex offenders selected for
commitment are not always the most violent; some exhibitionists are chosen, for example, while rapists are passed over.”).
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002).
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tal abnormality” is simply a diagnosis of pedophilia.
The Court
found that this volitional impairment requirement marked a distinct
enough subset of supposedly dangerous offenders to be constitutional, while a past sex offense conviction coupled with evidence of a
143
propensity for recidivism indicated sufficient dangerousness.
Notably absent from any of these standards are specific findings of
propensity for physical violence, use of weapons, self-harm, or drug
abuse. Moreover, even though traditional involuntary civil commitment requires a finding of dangerousness to oneself or others, this
does not always mean that the person has ever committed or attempted to commit a violent or self-harming act. Many states will accept mere threats to inflict serious harm, and courts are split over
whether an objective, outward manifestation of dangerousness is re144
quired at all.
In sum, commitment criteria do not strongly correlate with behaviors that create the security concerns that justify institutional search policies. Civil commitments standards therefore do
not map onto Fourth Amendment analysis.
It might not be significant that some patients are committed who
have not been shown to exhibit violent or self-harming behavior if
these commitments were rare. But patients who are not committed
on specific findings of these sorts of behaviors actually constitute a
significant number of patients receiving twenty-four hour residential
145
treatment. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact proportion of these
types of commitments in the total resident psychiatric population of
the United States. Commitments are governed by the states, which
146
do not aggregate their data and have disparate commitment laws,
and studies define psychiatric facility differently. Populations also
vary from facility to facility, based on a state’s commitment laws and
147
the way facilities are organized. Based on rough calculations from
142

143
144
145
146
147



Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 (“Hendricks’ diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies as a
‘mental abnormality’ under the Act, thus plainly suffices for due process purposes.”);.
Professor Stephen Morse has pointed out that one peculiar aspect of these committals is
that pedophilia diagnoses may not support an insanity defense against criminal charges.
Thus, a sex offender may be held criminally culpable at the same time as he is held nonresponsible in civil commitment proceedings. Stephen Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 136 (1996).
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357–58, 360.
See Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Dangerousness of Civil Commitment Candidates: A Six-Month Follow-Up, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 551, 555 n.6 (1990).
See infra note 148.
E.g., Hugh McGinley & Richard A. Pasewark, National Survey of the Frequency and Success of
the Insanity Plea and Alternate Pleas, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 207 (1989).
For example, in California, 92% of patients in state-run psychiatric facilities are committed through the criminal justice system, whereas most candidates for civil commitment
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148

other available estimates, however, 10,000 or more of the approx149
imately 55,000 individuals hospitalized at a given time may not involve any finding of dangerousness in the narrow sense relevant to
Fourth Amendment concerns—violence, self-harm, or drug abuse.
In addition, an additional 50% to 85% of patients in a typical residential facility might be voluntary admissions requiring no legal findings
150
for hospitalization.

148

149

150



are at least initially held in hospital inpatient psychiatric wards or private psychiatric hospitals. Katharine Mieszkowski, Napa State Hospital’s Grisly Inside Story, BAY CITIZEN (S.F.),
Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.baycitizen.org/health/story/napa-state-hospitals-grisly-insidestory; see also Steven P. Segal et al., Factors in the Use of Coercive Retention in Civil Commitment
Evaluations in Psychiatric Emergency Services, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 514, 515 (2001).
Recent estimates indicate that approximately 4,000 defendants are being held to restore
competency at any given time. Hal Wortzel et al., Crisis in the Treatment of Incompetency to
Proceed to Trial: Harbinger of a Systemic Illness, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 357, 357
(2007). Insanity acquittals are more rare, and few accurate estimates of their number are
available. McGinley & Pasewark, supra note 146, at 207 (“[P]olicy makers must still remain largely dependent upon limited and sporadic studies conducted by individual researchers or government agencies.”). An oft-cited estimate, however, is that only about
0.25% of defendants successfully raise this defense. E.g., John P. Martin, The Insanity Defense: A Closer Look, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/local/longterm/aron/qa227.htm. Therefore, based on the number of felony convictions each year in U.S. courts, a reasonable estimate might be about 2,750 NGRI committals per year. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Pottawattamie County v. McGhee,
130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (No. 08-1065) (“[T]here were . . . in the year 2006 . . . 1.1, approximately, million felony convictions.”), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1065.pdf. Because insanity committals can be
quite lengthy—possibly nine times longer than the sentence for the underlying offense—
the number of insanity acquittals per year may significantly under-represent the number
of insanity acquittees housed at a given time. See Perlin, supra note 129, at 210. As for sex
offenders, as of 2007, 2700 offenders were committed under laws in nineteen states; New
York has since passed an offender commitment law, bringing the total number of states to
twenty. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 139. Again, because in 2007 only 250 such offenders had ever been released, this figure likely accurately represents the number of sex
offenders involuntarily hospitalized at a given time. See id.
SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 705 (5th ed. 2009). Bruce Winick, however, has estimated the total number of individuals subject to involuntary hospitalization annually to be as high as 660,000. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A
THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE MODEL 2–3 (2005). Winick’s number, however, includes some voluntary hospitalizations and does not take into account that many individuals.
SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 149, at 857. Non-forensic facilities often hold a combination
of voluntarily and involuntarily admitted patients. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–
GEN. § 10-632(a) (West 2010) (authorizing involuntary commitments to Veterans Administration hospitals); SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 149, at 708–09 (describing the frequency
of government contracts with private hospitals for involuntary treatment). This raises the
question of whether the requirement of individualized suspicion should simply be governed by the “voluntary” versus “involuntary” status of a patient. This view could find
support in the facts of another psychiatric hospital Fourth Amendment case, Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (N.D.N.Y 2002), aff’d 80 Fed. App’x 146 (2d Cir. 2003). In
Aiken, the Northern District of New York likened psychiatric patients to prison visitors and
guards, who may be strip-searched only on reasonable suspicion of possessing contra-
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1. The Intersection of Civil Commitment and the Criminal Justice System
While not all types of involuntary commitment require dangerousness findings, some may only occur if the defendant has or is
suspected of having committed a criminal offense. It is true that
these charges might be a good indicator of future conduct, and thus
151
“dangerousness,” if there was past dangerous conduct. Even so, in
contrast to pretrial detainees, many, if not most, of those committed
152
for incompetency to stand trial are charged with minor offenses.
More NGRI defendants than incompetency detainees commit violent
crimes, but a substantial number—31.6% according to one study—
153
are committed on the basis of nonviolent offenses. Name notwithstanding, sexually violent predator programs often do not primarily
target violent sex offenders, and some committed sex offenders are
simply too old to be violent because so few are ever released from
154
commitment.

151
152

153
154



band. Id. at 234. The plaintiff was a voluntary admit to a state facility that also had involuntary patients. Id. at 218. Thus Aiken could be construed as limited by its facts to voluntary patients, although the court did not explicitly limit its holding. Such a rule would
pose more administrative difficulties than requiring individualized suspicion for all patients because staff in mixed facilities likely will have more information on, and interest
in, individual patients’ risk of violent behavior than their legal status. More importantly,
the distinction in mental health law between voluntary and involuntary commitments is
dubious. A substantial number of decisions to voluntarily enter a residential facility are
made either while the person is in some sort of official custody or after learning the results of an involuntary commitment proceeding. SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 149, at 860–
61. In addition, many commitment decisions are made while individuals are incompetent
or are the result of coercion. Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutional
and Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
1169, 1173–75 (1997); Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Law Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 517, 522–23 n.26 (1994).
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal
and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 591 n.102, (1995)
(“[Forty-two percent] of incompetency commitments were of persons charged with misdemeanors; 20-25% were charged with disorderly conduct.” (citing Walter Dickey, Incompetency and the Nondangerous Mentally Ill Client, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 22, 30–31 (1980))); id. at
593 (“[A] high percentage of incompetency cases arise out of misdemeanor
charges . . . .”).
Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 63, 67 (1994).
Davey & Goodnough, supra note 139 (“[Two hundred fifty] offenders [of 2,700 committed have been] released unconditionally since the first law was passed in
1990 . . . . [S]ome exhibitionists are chosen [for commitment], for example, while rapists
are passed over. And some are past the age at which some scientists consider them most
dangerous. In Wisconsin, a 102-year-old who wears a sport coat to dinner cannot participate in treatment because of memory lapses and poor hearing.”). But see Eric S. Janus,
The Use of Social Science and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 376 n.126 (1997) (“‘[T]he pure sex offender is a rarity; instead,
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In short, these patients’ alleged or past criminal conduct may suggest a propensity to do something, but not necessarily to commit dangerous acts involving contraband that could be the object of a search.
Rather, these patients’ conduct suggests they might have a propensity
to, for example, be disorderly, shoplift, commit sexual acts with minors, or expose themselves in public. Empirical data supports this intuition. Although some researchers argue that forensic patients
commit more serious assaults when they are violent, they have consistently been found to have lower rates of assault once institutionalized
than patients committed after a civil determination of dangerous155
ness.
Even conceding that some NGRI defendants or sex offenders may
have a propensity for violent acts for which contraband such as weapons or drugs might be useful or triggering, in order to qualify for an
NGRI verdict or sex offender commitment the behavior must be cau156
sally connected to a mental disorder.
If a predilection for violent
behavior is linked to a patient’s illness, the behavior should be expected to subside if the patient has been in the institution for more
157
than a short period and is responding to treatment.
Research on
hospital violence supports this point: violent incidents tend to occur
most frequently right after commitment and subside after time in the
158
hospital.
One objection might be that regardless of actual dangerousness,
incompetency and insanity committees are still entitled to less considerate treatment than sex offenders or traditional involuntary com159
mittees based on their quasi-criminal legal status.
For example, as

155

156
157

158
159



sex offenses are single or infrequent and often are embedded in an extensive criminal
history of property and violent crimes.’” (quoting Leonore M.J. Simon, The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
387, 392 (1997))).
Donald M. Linhorst & Lisa Parker Scott, Assaultive Behavior in State Psychiatric Hospitals:
Differences Between Forensic and Nonforensic Patients, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 857, 868
(2004) (“The results of this study are consistent with findings from previous studies that
forensic patients are less likely to commit assaults than nonforensic patients in psychiatric
hospitals.” (citations omitted)).
Morse, supra note 125, at 193.
See Hiday, supra note 144, at 553 (“Regardless of definition [of dangerousness] or admission grounds, most dangerous behavior occurred within the first 7–10 days of admission,
and most of that occurred on the first day and tended not to be repeated.” (citations
omitted)).
Simon Davis, Violence by Psychiatric Inpatients: A Review, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 585, 586 (1991).
E.g., Chris Kempner, Comment, Unfair Punishment of the Mentally Disabled? The Constitutionality of Treating Extremely Dangerous and Mentally Ill Insanity Acquittees in Prison Facilities, 23
U. HAW. L. REV. 623, 627 (2001) (arguing prisons should take over the care of insanity
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the Seventh Circuit has pointed out, a plaintiff may not object to
Bell’s due process holding when, in addition to his civilly committed
160
status, he is also a pretrial detainee.
In the case of NGRI defendants, however, the significance of the
criminal “conviction” to their legal status is minimal. The NGRI defendant is no longer a pretrial detainee because there is a verdict in
his case. At the same time, the successful affirmative NGRI defense
has made him ineligible for punishment because of a lack of culpabil161
ity. While proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a criminal act justifies fewer procedural protections before commitment of NGRI defendants, NGRI commitment is nevertheless not a criminal sentence
162
and remains civil in character. NGRI defendants’ legal status therefore differs minimally from that of other involuntarily committed detainees and does not alone justify abrogating their Fourth Amendment rights.
Although it is true that the incompetent to stand trial have criminal charges pending for which they may be tried if they gain competence, they nevertheless are not comparable to competent pretrial
detainees. Because they are not competent to stand trial, they are ineligible for criminal conviction and punishment in much the same
way as NGRI defendants. Additionally, the incompetent to stand trial
and competent pretrial detainees differ in ways that are relevant to
the security risks that justified the Bell standard for pretrial detainee
searches. Pretrial detention in both the state and federal systems is
not an automatic consequence of criminal charges. Detention depends to a great degree on the nature of the offense and other fac163
tors pointing to a defendant’s dangerousness.
Indeed, nearly two164
thirds of felony defendants alone are released on bail.

160

161
162
163



acquittees who have committed a violent crime and may do so because they do not have
“true civil status”).
Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2003) (“And one must keep in mind that
they are pretrial detainees as well as civil committees: criminal charges against them are
pending.”) Allison v. Snyder was an unusual case in that the plaintiffs were part of a pretrial diversion program for sex offenders where civil commitment would occur in lieu of
trial, but criminal charges remained open until successful completion of treatment. Id. at
1078; see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366–70 (1986). The Allison court’s characterization of these offenders is not typical of incompetency commitments, as criminal
charges are normally dismissed if competency is not restored.
See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419 (2002).
John Parry, The Civil-Criminal Dichotomy in Insanity Commitment and Release Proceedings:
Hinckley and Other Matters, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 218, 218–19 (1987).
Judges have wide discretion in setting bail amounts, but they typically factor prior convictions and the seriousness of the offense into their decisions. Preventive detention without bail is usually limited to the most serious or violent offenses, and often also requires a
prior criminal record. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:
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In contrast, almost all incompetent defendants are committed regardless of the degree of the offense, and usually without the option
165
of quickly disposing of minor cases through a guilty plea. Furthermore, recall that a large proportion of those held for incompetency
166
to stand trial are charged with minor offenses. If these defendants
were not mentally ill or disabled, many of them would not be subject
to pretrial detention at all. Moreover, when competent misdemeanor
offenders are detained, in most jurisdictions—including the Eighth
167
Circuit—they are ineligible for suspicionless strip searches. The result is that incompetent detainees are subject to less Fourth Amendment protection while in custody solely on the basis of their mental
illness or impairment.
2. Predicting Dangerousness
Of the individuals committed under traditional civil commitment
criteria, most are committed either for lack of self-care, inability to
avoid physical harm, or dangerousness to themselves, rather than vi168
olence toward others.
Even among those involuntarily committed
specifically for dangerousness to others, however, the weight such a
finding should carry in Fourth Amendment analysis is questionable.
While the Supreme Court has taken the position that “from a legal
point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct,” this assertion flies in the face of em-

164
165

166
167

168

CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 856–60, 877 (3d ed. 2007). Socioeconomic
factors might confound the link between pretrial detention and violence or seriousness of
the offense, although the practice of bail bond dealing might lessen their effects. Id. at
858–59 (describing the role of bail bond dealers in ameliorating the race and gender disparities in pretrial release).
Id. at 857.
Perlin, supra note 129, at 203–04 (“When defendants are incompetent to stand trial, the
overwhelming majority are committed to state hospitals.”); Winick, supra note 152, at 591
(“Defendants arrested for a petty offense, such as disorderly conduct or shoplifting, can
usually plead guilty and pay a small fine. If those defendants are incompetent to stand
trial, however, they may face many months of incarceration . . . . If defendants eventually
are restored to competency and returned to court, they probably will accept the same
plea bargain at that point.”).
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 299 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that
ten circuit courts of appeal had held that reasonable suspicion was required to strip
search detainees charged with “minor offenses” since Bell, but that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had recently reversed their rulings on the issue), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
1816 (2011); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1985) (following decisions by
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits).
Hiday, supra note 144, at 553.
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pirical data on the accuracy of dangerousness predictions in the con169
text of civil commitment decisions.
Prediction of dangerousness among the mentally ill has long been
170
controversial.
Studies suggest that little stock can be placed in
mental health professionals’ clinical judgments of dangerousness be171
cause of a high false positive rate. Clinicians are better able to capture the individuals who end up committing violent acts than they are
172
at excluding those who do not.
Although their accuracy is more
impressive when the low base rate of violent behavior is taken into ac173
count, their absolute accuracy is still quite low. Courts have nevertheless traditionally relied on these types of predictions in legal de174
terminations and continue to do so today.
Actuarial or statistical predictive tools, which are considered more
accurate than clinical violence predictions, have only recently become available in the form of violence risk assessment instruments
175
(“VRAIs”). While VRAIs consistently have been shown to be superior to clinical prediction, measures of their validity are perhaps misleading. Favorable validation studies of these assessments have been
based on a statistical tool that calculates the probability of a patient
who was later violent having a higher VRAI score than one who was

169
170

171

172

173
174
175

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
278 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
80, 87 & n.58 (1995).
John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 406–07 (2006) (“[O]f the patients predicted to be
violent by the clinicians, one-in-two later committed a violent act, while of the patients
predicted to be safe, one-in-three later committed a violent act.”). Clinical prediction
usually occurs after the mental health professional interviews the subject. The professional asks questions “designed to determine the individual’s current mental status and to
obtain a life history,” and draws inferences from the information in the answers, “presumably based on the interviewer’s professional education, training, and experience.”
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 109 (1984).
Monahan, supra note 171, at 406–07 (“Patients who elicited professional concern regarding future violence were moderately more likely to be violent after discharge (fifty-three
percent) than were patients who had not attracted such concern (thirty-six percent).”).
Slobogin, supra note 171, at 112–13 (noting that clinical predictions of experienced professionals were three times better than chance).
Monahan, supra note 171, at 407; Slobogin, supra note 171, at 109.
Monahan, supra note 171, at 408. Actuarial prediction involves combining an individual’s
traits known to be linked to violent behavior to arrive at a probability that he will behave
violently. Slobogin, supra note 171, at 109–10.
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176

not. In the case of two particularly celebrated VRAIs, this figure was
177
around seventy percent.
As one commentator notes, what this assessment really shows is
that these studies are better predictors of a binary outcome—violence
versus no violence—than chance, which would be expected to group
178
fifty percent of patients correctly. That is, the verification method
indicates little about a particular individual’s propensity for violence
or recidivism but rather distinguishes between group members. It
simply “tells us that seventy of those [one hundred] ranked, whether
[violent] or not, were ranked correctly,” without indicating the
chances that a particular individual is one of that correctly ranked seventy percent, and much less whether he should be in the violent cat179
egory.
In addition, “slippage,” or a difference between validation
statistics and actual violence or recidivism, can occur because of differences between the study population and the populations on which
180
it is later used. Most VRAIs are based on data on, and are aimed at
calculating the probability of, criminal recidivism or violent behavior
181
upon discharge from the hospital.
Although this metric may be most relevant to deciding whether an
individual should be involuntarily committed to protect the public,
research indicates that it has little relevance to the probability of vio182
lent behavior in a hospital environment. Assaultive behavior during
inpatient treatment has been shown to be a poor indicator of violence outside the hospital, and each results from different risk fac183
tors. Even an accurate VRAI result may not indicate any probability

176

177

178

179
180
181
182

183

The statistical tool is known as “Receiver Operator Characteristic,” or ROC, which is described in John A. Fennel, Punishment by Another Name: The Inherent Overreaching in Sexually Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 37, 54–55
(2009).
The Classification of Violence Risk (“COVR”), created from data collected during the
most comprehensive violence study to date, the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study; and the STATIC-99, which estimates recidivism among sex offenders. For citations
describing the MacArthur Study, see generally Monahan, supra note 171, at 411 n.80.
For a much more detailed discussion of the methodological problems with risk assessment instruments, see generally Fennel, supra note 176, on whom I draw throughout the
next two paragraphs of analysis.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 57–58.
Patrick Lussier et al., Chronic Violent Patients in an Inpatient Psychiatric Hospital: Prevalence,
Description, and Identification, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 5, 5–6 (2010).
See id. (“[A] pattern of violent behavior manifested during inpatient treatment is not necessarily indicative of an increased risk of violence following discharge.” (citations omitted)).
Id. at 6 (“[P]erpetration of violence during inpatient treatment may be influenced by different risk factors than those influencing the commission of community violence.”).

June 2011]

PRISONERS OF THE MIND

1465

of misconduct in an institutional environment because this is not
what the instrument was designed to measure. These issues with predictive instruments therefore cast doubt on claims that the civilly
committed can be presumed dangerous, even when the most cuttingedge methods are used to make the prediction.
Whether or not predictive instruments to identify the violent or
sexually compulsive among the mentally ill are accurate, civil commitment hearings are usually non-adversarial, “rubber stamp” pro184
ceedings whose reliability is questionable. While a formal hearing is
required, commitment candidates’ own attorneys often abdicate their
adversarial role in favor of a “best interests” approach, resulting in lit185
tle testing of the evidence in favor of confinement.
In addition,
judges almost always defer to the recommendations of the state186
provided expert witness.
Many judges follow the expert’s recom187
mendation more than ninety-five percent of the time. This is particularly significant because of the strong incentive for experts to
over-recommend commitment out of fear of liability under Tarasoff v.
188
Regents of the University of California, which some commentators argue has approached a phobic level among mental health profession189
als.

184
185

186

187
188

189

Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 37, 40–42 (1999) (citations omitted).
Id. at 40–41. This relaxed advocacy might be less true with respect to sex offender commitments because the defense bar has vigorously opposed these statutes, primarily on
double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. See, e.g., Fennel, supra note 176, at 39 (discussing shortcomings of a Massachusetts statute that aims to determine which sex offenders are at a high risk for reoffending, such that they ought to be civilly committed).
See Winick, supra note 184, at 41–42 (“[J]udicial agreement with expert witnesses in this
area ranges from seventy-nine to one hundred percent, and most frequently exceeds ninety-five percent.”).
Id.
551 P.2d 334, 353 (Cal. 1976) (holding a therapist civilly liable for the murder of a woman by his patient when the therapist heard his patient threatened to kill her, because he
failed to warn the victim).
Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the
1990’s, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 45–47 (1992) (citing, inter alia, Stanley L. Brodsky,
Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 496, 497
(1988)); id. at 61–62 (1992) (citing, inter alia, Stanley L. Brodsky, Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 497 (1988)).
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V. INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
A. Security in Psychiatric Hospitals and Prisons
Even if the accuracy of dangerousness predictions is suspect, psychiatric hospitals may still be so dangerous as to make blanket search
policies reasonable. Unfortunately, reliable statistics regarding rates
of violence or possession of contraband in psychiatric hospitals versus
190
prisons are not available. In official estimates for both types of facil191
In addition,
ities, violent incidents are drastically underreported.
researchers’ estimates are based on such disparate metrics that any
comparison between available studies on psychiatric hospital and
192
prison misconduct would be misleading.
Nevertheless, while not to minimize the dangers that hospital personnel and patients might face, some research indicates that the
threat of serious misconduct—particularly involving contraband or
193
weapons—is low in psychiatric facilities. It is true that assaultive or
aggressive behavior is increasing in inpatient facilities, and rates of
workplace injury of staff are much higher than in other occupa194
tions.
Even so, “civil commitment candidates do not tend to be
dangerous, much less violent, within the 6 months following” commitment, and “[t]hose who behave[] dangerously rarely inflict[] in195
jury.”
Furthermore, patient aggression more often takes the form

190

191
192

193

194
195

See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, A
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, 24–25 (2006),
available at http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confronting_Confinement.pdf (describing “imprecision and unreliability of the data on assaults”); Ralph Slovenko, Commentary, Violent Attacks in Psychiatric and Other Hospitals, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249, 249
(2006) (noting that “the actual number of attacks in hospitals is inexact” and that “there
is no national reporting system” of hospital violence).
GIBBONS & DE B. KATZENBACH, supra note 190, at 24–25; Slovenko, supra note 190, at 249–
50.
Compare, e.g., Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 34
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 588, 593, 595 (2007) (estimating the percentage of prison inmates
who had been victims of assault and the number of assaults per 1000 inmates), with Linhorst & Scott, supra note 155, at 864 (measuring the percentage of patients who committed acts of violence and the rate of assault per one hundred days).
See e.g., Davis, supra note 158, at 585 (noting studies that support the conclusion “that serious incidents are rare”); Hiday, supra note 144, at 562 (noting that those who did behave dangerously “rarely inflicted injury”). But see Slovenko, supra note 190, at 249
(“[T]he actual number of attacks in hospitals . . . is considered to be extensive.”).
Slovenko, supra note 190, at 249–51.
Hiday, supra note 144, at 562 (“[W]e found candidates to be far less dangerous and violent after going through the civil commitment process.”).
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of verbal threats than violent attacks, except during instances when
196
staff are administering medication.
Although rates of assault remain high, serious violence in prisons
has also decreased over the past thirty years to fairly low levels; in fact,
as of 2003, the homicide rate in prisons was lower than that of the
197
general population. This decrease in serious prison violence might
suggest that the levels of violence and the security concerns of psychiatric hospitals and prisons are comparable and that, therefore,
similar search policies will be reasonable in both contexts. The decrease also raises the point in Bell, however, that little contraband had
been discovered in that facility precisely because the search policy was
198
an effective deterrent.
In recent years, prisons have implemented
199
increasingly aggressive security interventions. Notably, many of the
most difficult-to-control inmates are now totally isolated from other
inmates, and largely prison personnel as well, in what is basically
200
permanent solitary confinement.
Serious violence and weapons
could similarly be rare in psychiatric facilities because of discovery or
deterrence through searches, but this argument is less convincing. As
opposed to prisons, which uniformly seem to maintain broad search
policies regardless of security level, psychiatric hospitals appear to
vary widely in their security practices, which therefore may not play as
great a causal role in the level of serious violence overall as in pris201
ons.
Another significant way in which the security concerns of prisons
differ from those in psychiatric hospitals is the role of prison gangs in
violent incidents and smuggling of contraband. Gangs are responsi202
ble for a large proportion of prison violence, and membership cor196
197
198

199
200

201

202



Slovenko, supra note 190, at 251.
Alan Gomez, States Work to Curb Prison Violence, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-08-21-prisondeaths_N.htm.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“That there has been only one instance where
an MCC inmate was discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution on
his person may be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the inmates to secrete and import such
items when the opportunity arises.” (footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., Gomez, supra note 197.
See Sharon Shalev, Solitary, NEW HUMANIST, Jan.–Feb. 2011, http://newhumanist.org.uk/
2479/solitary (discussing use of “supermax confinement” to safely manage the “worst of
the worst” predators in the prison system).
See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 26–42, Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009) (No.
05-3441), (discussing another sex offender treatment facility in Minnesota with the same
security level as the facility in Serna that centered its inmate search policy around probable cause).
See John Winterdyk & Rick Ruddell, Managing Prison Gangs: Results from a Survey of U.S.
Prison Systems, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 730, 731 (2010) (“[A] recent study by the Department of
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relates significantly with both violent behavior and disobeying prison
203
Moreover, gangs
rules in general, including possession of drugs.
are a major, if not the primary, source of contraband within pris204
ons.
Manipulation of prison personnel and maintenance of networks outside the prison significantly contribute to inmate gangs’
ability to arrange for contraband to be brought to the prison and past
205
prison security. Competition for control of contraband “rackets” is
206
itself a precipitant of prison violence.
In contrast, gangs do not seem to be among the main factors associated with violence in psychiatric facilities. While there are some
anecdotal reports of gang activity in psychiatric facilities that primari207
ly house patients committed during the criminal justice process,
gangs do not appear in the literature on violence risk factors. Instead, studies suggest that low expenditures on care and environmental stressors are some of the most significant predictors of ward vi208
olence.
B. Individualized Suspicion: Administrative Feasibility and Deference to
Institutional Decision-making
Perhaps consistent with the difficulty of dangerousness prediction,
numerous studies have concluded that a small number of patients are
responsible for the majority of violent outbursts in inpatient psychia209
tric facilities. In one study, 56% of violent episodes were the fault

203

204

205
206

207
208

209



Corrections for Washington State reported that gang members . . . accounted for 43 percent of all major violent infractions inside their prisons.” (citation omitted)).
See Gerald G. Gaes et al., The Influence of Prison Gang Affiliation on Violence and Other Prison
Misconduct, 82 PRISON J. 359, 360–61, 381 (2002) (discussing research that shows that
prison gang affiliation increases the probability of violence and other prison misconduct).
George W. Knox, The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STG’s) in American Prisons
Today: Recent Research Findings From the 2004 Prison Gang Survey, NAT’L GANG CRIME
RESEARCH CTR. (2005), available at http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/corr2006.html; Winterdyk & Ruddell, supra note 202, at 731.
Winterdyk & Ruddell, supra note 202, at 731.
See Knox, supra note 204 (“For example, in March of 2004, a prison riot in Puerto Rico
resulted in two inmates killed and five wounded, which was started by gang members
fighting over who would control the a [sic] shipment of illegal drugs . . . .”).
See Mieszkowski, supra note 147 (noting one treatment facility, Napa State Hospital, that is
“rife with gang activity, methamphetamine use, pimping and extortion”).
Michael Daffern & Kevin Howells, Psychiatric Inpatient Aggression: A Review of Structural and
Functional Assessment Approaches, 7 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 477, 487 (2002);
Laurent S. Lehmann et al., A Survey of Assaultive Behavior in Veterans Health Administration
Facilities, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 384, 386 (1999).
E.g., Raymond B. Flannery, Jr., Repetitively Assaultive Psychiatric Patients: Review of Published
Findings, 1978–2001, 73 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 229, 231 (2002); John E. Kraus & Brian B. Sheit-
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210

of 1.4% of patients. Moreover, evidence points to levels of violence
211
decreasing sharply after initial intake. There is therefore empirical
justification for search policies targeting newly admitted patients
beyond the fact that intake is the most obvious point of entry for contraband.
More importantly, these findings suggest that an individualized
suspicion standard may not be so difficult to implement. Predicting
violence in patients after hospital admittance is hardly easier than before commitment. Nevertheless, the concentration of violent behavior in a few patients might still give staff a good idea of which patients pose the most risk based on their day-to-day interactions, past
violent behavior in the institutional setting, progress in treatment,
and stage of illness. Staff might be able to use these intuitions as a
starting point to target particular patients when there is a potential
security breach.
These findings also suggest a role for deference to institutional
judgment. As long as the hospital administrators could show some
effort was made to differentiate between individual patients, courts
could review their judgment that individualized suspicion existed as
to a particular patient under a deferential standard. This would allow
courts to avoid making treatment or medical judgments that they are
incompetent to perform, while still allowing for protection of patients’ constitutional rights. For the involuntarily committed, a degree of court involvement with institutional affairs may not only be
appropriate, but also necessary in light of their well-documented vul212
nerability and difficulty asserting their rights on their own.

210
211
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man, Characteristics of Violent Behavior in a Large State Psychiatric Hospital, 55 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 183, 183 (2004).
Kraus & Sheitman, supra note 209, at 183.
Lehmann et al., supra note 208, at 387 (“The admitting and triage areas . . . had the
second highest rate per work unit of assaultive behavior.”); Hiday, supra note 144, at 553
(“Regardless of definition or admission grounds, most dangerous behavior occurred within the first 7–10 days of admission, and most of that occurred on the first day and tended
not to be repeated.” (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)). But see Lehmann et al., supra note 208, at 386 (“Length of stay was strongly associated with the rate of assaultive incidents per patient . . . .”).
See Robbins v. Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D.N.M. 1990) (“[M]any mentally ill individuals have difficulty recognizing the concept that they have rights and will not necessarily identify even the most egregious abuse as a violation of their rights. Even if cognizant
of their rights, many of these individuals have difficulty assessing whether their rights
have been violated . . . . In addition, both the effects of medications and of mental illness
may cause confusion and problems with memory, making it difficult to remember and
explain possible rights violations after the lapse of several days . . . . [T]he combined effects of medication, mental illness, and the passive characteristic of institutionalized
people would inhibit many residents from initiating a phone call to a stranger to talk
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CONCLUSION
Neither comparisons of the two groups in precedent, nor the legal
status of the civilly committed, justifies this association. On the contrary, the involuntarily committed can be distinguished from pretrial
detainees because of their right to be free from punishment and the
treatment purposes of their confinement. Furthermore, not all forms
of civil commitment require dangerousness findings, and there is reason to believe that such findings are inaccurate predictors of misconduct during inpatient treatment. There is also little empirical evidence of the similarity of psychiatric hospital and prison population
behavior during confinement, whereas there is some evidence indicating that the security concerns they raise are disparate.
This Comment does not assert that involuntarily committed patients never pose security risks or that psychiatric facilities do not face
significant administrative problems. Rather, it is meant to cast doubt
on the assumption that the danger involuntarily committed patients
pose as a group is so great that they should be analogized to the criminally accused and treated almost as harshly as convicted prisoners.
Under civil commitment standards as they are currently structured,
this assumption is unwarranted. At the same time, the problem may
not lie so much with Fourth Amendment analyses that assume that
the involuntarily committed are likely to be dangerous, as with using
civil commitment procedures to incapacitate extremely dangerous
individuals who have slipped through the cracks of the criminal justice system. Indeed, the continued viability of a strong criminal-civil
distinction in constitutional law has been a topic of much discussion
213
since the rise of sex offender commitment statutes. Nevertheless, as
long as this “distinction is one that the Supreme Court continues to
214
take seriously,” the distinction between the Fourth Amendment
rights of the involuntarily committed and the criminally confined
should be vigorously enforced as well through a requirement of individualized suspicion for searches of patients’ persons.

213

214

about problems they are having in the institution.”), quoted in Kelsey McCowan Heilman,
Comment, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations’ Associational Standing
to Sue, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 273–74 (2008).
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the CivilCriminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 69, 76–80 (1996) (discussing the importance of the civil-criminal distinction
in light of states’ “sexually violent predator” statutes).
Id. at 78.

